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Abstract—Residential users get most of their preferred content 
(e.g., films, news) from their wireless access point, which is 
connected to content providers through one or several network 
providers. Nowadays, these access points have enough storage 
and wireless transmission capacities to distribute the content to 
neighboring access points if required and allowed by the user. 
Based on this concept, this paper considers a hybrid content 
distribution model in peer-to-peer content deliver networks. A 
user or peer in this network can get its content either directly 
from the content provider (CP), or from a neighboring user who 
has this content  stored  and  is  willing  to  share  it.  Two types 
of users are considered: premium users are the users getting 
always the content directly from the CP, and standard user are 
the users getting the content from other standard users, when 
possible, otherwise from the CP. Furthermore, standard user 
share their content to other users if required. This paper studies 
the pricing problem of the CP such that there are enough standard 
users to distribute the content (using  less  network  resources  
and reducing significantly the delay) while maximizing the CP 
benefits. We address the problem from a game theoretic approach 
and evaluate when the Nash Equilibrium can be attained. The 
obtained case have been applied to a real life study using a BBC 
iPlayer dataset and an analysis on the CP benefits dependence on 
different parameters. Finally we extend this pricing model when 
considering also the reduction of load on its content custodian 
(server) and discuss how the pricing policy is affected. 
Index Terms—Digital content, Game theory, Media delivery 
platform, NBS, Pricing policy 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Throughout the last decades, the media industry is shift-   
ing from delivering content via physical medium to digital 
medium. After the commercialization of Internet in 1994, 
there has been an exponential growth in digital media content 
delivery services [1]. According to a CISCO report [2], almost 
84% of the internet traffic will be video content by the end of 
this year (2019). 
In the media distribution industry, the three most important 
players are: 
1) Content provider (CP), such as Netflix, is the owner of 
the content and takes care of its distribution. CP has   
full control over the content and is solely responsible   
to determine all the attributes (such as pricing and 
distribution policy) related to the content. 
2) Network provider (NP), such as Deutsche Telekom, 
owns the network that delivers the content from the CP 
servers to the users. 
 
3) Content consumer, i.e., users, download and use (e.g., 
listens, watches) the content. Users pay for the content 
and acquire it from CP through a NP. 
Primarily, there are three types of content distribution 
models: centralized, decentralized and hybrid. The centralized 
model is implemented as a client-server system where the 
content placement, content pricing and customer relationships 
are centrally managed by the CP without being biased by 
users. CP can set or change the price of the content and 
distribution policy according to its own strategy. To get the 
content, a user has to buy it with a price set by CP. The 
disadvantage of this model is that, as the content is available 
only in CP’s server, the load on CP’s server remains very high 
all the time if it is a popular content. Also, when the server    
is multiple hops away from the user, the latency for content 
delivery increases. 
The second model is the decentralized model, which is 
implemented as a peer-to-peer (P2P) network where the users 
participate into the process of content distribution by trading 
content [3]. In this case, a user can store the downloaded 
content in any cache-enabled home device (e.g., Apple TV) 
and share it with other users who are interested in the same 
content. The advantage of this model is that it reduces the 
load of the CP’s servers up to a certain extent [4]. However, 
the disadvantage from the CP perspective is that the CP is not 
the sole owner of the content. Thus, while determining the 
price of the content, the CP has to take user’s preferences into 
account. 
A hybrid content distribution model is a combination of 
both centralized and decentralized models [5]. In this model,  
a user can choose whether to get the desired content in the 
centralized or the decentralized way, that is, directly from CP 
or from other users. The price of the content is different in 
these two cases. From the perspective of CP, this model finds 
a compromise between centralized and decentralized model:   
it reduces the load on CP’s  server up to some extent, but at 
the same time, CP looses control on the content pricing and 
distribution. From user perspective, this model offers user the 
choice on where to get the content from and how much price 
user pays for it. 
In this paper, for the sake of clarity but without losing 
generality, we refer to a hybrid content distribution model 
based on the Wi-Fi enabled content sharing architecture [6], 
[7]. In this architecture, users are connected to the CP through 
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a fixed network provided by NP and also to other used through 
Wi-Fi technology. In this hybrid model, CP offers the users 
two options: Premium and Standard,  which  correspond  to 
the centralized and distributed content distribution models 
respectively. If a user selects the Premium option, he/she can 
directly download the content from the CP’s server and he/she 
does not have to store it nor share it with other users. In this 
case, the CP has the responsibility of delivering the content, 
which involves various costs for CP,  as for example, the fee  
to the NP. On the other hand, if a user selects the Standard 
option, he/she must check the availability of the content with 
other Standard users before requesting CP for it. If the content 
is available with any other Standard user, the content delivery 
takes place from one user to another user and does not incur 
any cost to the CP. It can be safely assumed that a user 
selecting the Standard option always agrees to share any stored 
content and has all necessary devices and infrastructure. 
Motivation: Based on our previous works [6], [7] on a 
content placement strategy from the perspective of CP in a 
hybrid content distribution model, we provide in this paper a 
content pricing policy from the perspective of CP to achieve   
a viable and advantageous pricing for both CP and users. 
In the hybrid content distribution model, from the user per- 
spective, selecting the Standard option is the cheapest choice 
but may not be the best one. For example, if we consider a 
hybrid video sharing architecture [6], [7], a user may not be 
able to watch HD videos when selecting the Standard option 
as it depends on the link capacity and availability between 
users. The same user will be able to do so when selecting     
the Premium option. So the choice of selecting Premium or 
Standard option entirely depends on the user’s willingness to 
pay for the content and the content itself. So, it is difficult for 
CP to predict accurately which option a user will choose and 
hence, which pricing policy the user will consider. 
Now, both Premium and Standard options have advantage 
and disadvantage from the perspective of CP. If more users 
select the Premium option, the revenue of the CP increases but 
at the same time, the load on the CP’s server also increases, 
which causes an increase of the maintenance cost and energy 
consumption. On the other hand, if more users select the 
Standard option, the load on the CP’s  server  reduces,  but 
also the revenue generated by CP decreases. Our main target  
is to propose a pricing policy from the perspective of a CP, 
which is robust against the uncertainty of the number of users 
choosing the Premium and Standard options. Although this 
pricing policy has been developed having the Wi-Fi enabled 
content sharing architecture [6], [7] in mind, it is to be noted 
that it is valid for any kind of hybrid content distribution 
network. 
Our contribution: The main contributions of this paper are: 
• Find the price of the content when the benefits of both, CP 
and users, are maximized and the equilibrium is obtained 
when possible. 
• Identify the conflicts of interest between CPs and users, 
and determine the cases where an agreement between 
them is feasible. In those cases, the price is determined 
by the Nash Bargaining Solution (NBS). 
• Apply the proposed solution in a real case study (using 
real life data in UK) to observe the impact of the different 
parameters in the pricing policy. 
• Extend the pricing model to include the load reduction  
on CP’s server. 
To the best of our knowledge, this work is the first one to 
introduce an NBS based pricing policy for a hybrid digital 
content distribution system. 
The paper has been organized as follows: we discuss prior 
research works related to digital content distribution in Section 
2. In Section 3 we elaborate the problem, we study in the 
paper, with example. In Section 4 we discuss three different 
cases and propose a pricing policy in each case. We also 
incorporate a study based on real life data for analyzing the 
pricing policy in Section 5. As an extension of the discussed 
pricing model, we also include another important parameter 
(load reduction on CP’s server) and update the pricing policy 
in Section 6 with concluding the paper in Section 7. 
 
II. RELATED WORK 
There have already been previous research works on the 
pricing of digital content in centralized ( [8]–[12]) and decen- 
tralized distribution models ( [13]–[15]), but there is no prior 
research work on the hybrid distribution model addressed in 
this paper. 
Several works have addressed digital content pricing in 
centralized distribution model. For example, in [8] the authors 
explore about Music  as  a  Service  and  find  out  that  next  
to price, contract duration and product  qualities  are  two  
most important product attributes. Their research also studies 
configurations on consumers’ utility and their willingness to 
pay for premium offers. The paper [9] compares between two 
business models. In the first, free of access is provided with 
low product quality and advertisements, while in the second 
the access is charged and product is of high quality. It has 
been shown that if the users are advertisement tolerant, the 
first policy is more profitable than the second one. Researchers 
in [10] studied the same thing and showed that companies are 
better off providing both pricing and advertising options to 
consumers. They suggested that as advertisement revenue rate 
increases, advertising level should be kept low and based on 
the factors that affect the price and advertising decisions, they 
derived the optimal price and advertising level. In [11], two 
kind of policies - fee based and free with advertisement, were 
studied in detail and was shown that the mix group that uses 
both free and fee strategies are the most profitable ones. In [12] 
the authors analyzed the pricing schemes and DRM (digital 
right management) protection policy with respect to different 
collaborative market structures. As the piracy is closely asso- 
ciated with the objects and the distribution channel, they also 
examine the impact of content quality and network effects on 
the development of strategies based on all these factors. But 
this is a model for host centric network only, no discussion  
for peer-to-peer networks. 
Significant research has also been conducted on digital 
content pricing in decentralized model also. In [13] the re- 
searchers proposed a game theory based pricing policy for 
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job allocation in mobile grid networks. They introduced a 
game theoretic framework to obtain pricing model between     
a Wireless Access Point server and a mobile device. Along 
with that, they also introduced a game theory based workload 
allocation scheme for the mobile devices to maximize the 
revenue. In [14] the authors proposed a lottery based P2P 
pricing scheme. This model provides higher revenue for peers 
who intend to participate and contribute  with  other  peers  
and higher cost for those who  choose  to  behave  selfishly. 
But the service provider is  not  included  in  the  game,  so  
the pricing policy of the content provider is not taken into 
account. The paper [15] compares between two models of 
digital content distribution - client-server model and peer-to- 
peer model. They described a monopolistic pricing scheme  
for distributing digital content over peer-to-peer networks that 
rewards peer users who participate in the distribution process 
and showed that peer-to-peer model is more profitable if 
pricing mechanism provides strong incentives to users to share 
content. 
All the previous research works described above are based 
on the pricing and distribution of digital content in centralized 
and decentralized content distribution model. To the best of 
our knowledge, this work is the first one providing a game 
theoretic pricing policy in a hybrid content distribution model, 
i.e., where a user can choose either the centralized or the 
decentralized model to get the content. 
 
III. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
In this section, the pricing problem considered in this paper 
is formulated. At first we discuss the background necessary 
for formulation of this problem. Then objective functions are 
defined, constraints are discussed and a detailed example is 
given for better understanding. 
 
A. Background 
As stated earlier, the content distribution network usually 
involves three players to deliver the content, as shown in Fig. 
1: content provider (CP), network provider (NP) and the user 
(referred also as content customer (CC)). Let us consider a 
content distribution model of a single CP, a single or multiple 
NPs and multiple users. All users are connected to the CP    
via fixed network(s) provided by NP(s). If there are multiple 
NPs in the model, we assume that each NP charges the same 
amount of money (pn) to CP.  In addition to that, every user   
is connected to his/her neighboring user(s) via Wi-Fi and is 
reachable by every other user in single or multiple hops. 
Let us denote x to be the total number of users who get        
a particular content c from CP. These users can select one of 
the following two options: 
• Premium service: This option guarantees the user to get 
the content from the server of CP at a cost of pb [e /Byte]. 
This cost includes the cost of the original content as well 
as the energy cost associated to the content delivery. The 
users, who select this service, are called Premium users 
(shown in blue in Fig. 2). 
• Standard service: This option allows the user to get the 
content from other Standard neighboring users, who have 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1: Top-down Content distribution: from content provider 
to user, with highlighted players of the game. 
 
the  appropriate  content.  Any  Standard  user  agrees  on 
sharing  its  content  with  any  other  interested  Standard 
user.  The  cost  that  a  Standard  user  has  to  pay  to  a 
content c is pJb < pb [e /Byte]. However, this cost does 
not  include  the  energy  cost,  which  should  be  charged 
to a user only in case of content sharing. The consumed 
energy is proportional with the size of the content. Let us 
denote energy cost per transmitted Byte with s [e /Byte] 
which  is  charged  to  the  Standard  user  who  is  sharing. 
Furthermore,  in  order  to  encourage  the  content  sharing 
among users who select the Standard option, CP not only 
charges  less  for  getting  the  same  content  (pJb < pb)  but 
also offers a compensation price pu [e /Byte] every time 
that a user shares the content with another user. The users, 
who select this service, are called Standard users (shown 
in green in Fig. 2). 
Let us consider, that y out of x users are Premium users and 
hence, x − y are Standard users. 
 
B. Objective Functions 
In  this  paper,  we  formulate  a  bargaining  framework  only 
among  those  who  already  own  c and  who  can  share  it  with 
others.  The  users,  who  do  not  own  the  content,  have  no 
leverage  for  bargaining  and  they  are  kept  outside  of  the 
bargaining framework. Similarly, as a Premium user does not 
share content, no Premium user can take part in the bargaining. 
As  it  is  a  connected  network,  we  also  assumed  that  the 
Standard user who gets the content first is the only one to share 
it  with  other  interested  Standard  users.  The  problem  that  we 
want to address is to find the content costs pb, pJb and sharing 
discount pu such that benefits for the user (Benuser ) and for 
the  CP  (BenCP )  are  maximised.  Benefits  are  defined  as  the 
difference between revenues and costs. For a given content c, 
both BenCP (·) and Benuser(·) can be given by the following 
theory Local provider 
 
... 
... 
 
MGM 
 
Netflix 
 
Users 
 
Content Customer (CC) 
 
Network Provider (NP) 
E.g., Telefonica, Vodafone 
 
Platform Provider (PP) 
E.g., YouTube, Netflix 
 
Content Provider (CP) 
E.g., MGM 
4 
 
Server u1 
u 
u3 
u4 
− 
− 
Σ { } 
. 
 
 
 
New content c t1 t2 t3 
 
 
 
Premium user 
 
2 
 
 
Standard user 
 
Server u1 
u2 
u3 
u4 
 
Server u1 
u2 
u3 
u4 
t5 
 
Server u1 
u2 
u3 
u4 
t6 
 
 
2 2 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 2: Case example with x = 4 users: y = 1 and x y = 3 
users getting Premium and Standard access respectively. 
 
   Notation Description  
f [Bytes] File size 
x Total number of users who download the file 
y Number of users who download the file via 
premium option 
k Percentage of users who download the file via 
premium option 
pn [e /Byte] Price paid by CP to network provider to deliver 
a content from server to client 
pb [e /Byte] Price a user pays to CP when the user gets the 
content selecting premium option 
pJb [e /Byte] Price a user pays to CP when the user gets the 
content selecting standard option 
r Ratio between premium and standard service 
cost 
pu [e /Byte] Reward given to user by CP who shares the 
content in standard option 
s [e /Byte] Energy  cost  charged  to  the  Standard  user per 
Byte when sharing the content with other Stan- 
  dard users  
 
Fig. 3: Steps of content distribution in the hybrid distribution 
model 
 
C. Constraints 
In this problem, the values of x, y, f , pn, s for a particular 
c are constant. The pricing model is limited by the following 
constraints: 
• pb > pJb: This constraint due to the fact that Premium 
users get content directly from CP’s server and it incurs 
additional cost to CP compared with the Standard users. 
• pJb > pn: Let us consider the worst case scenario, when 
only one user watches the content, i.e., x = 1. Hence, this 
user cannot share the content with any other user. In this 
case,  the  total  benefit  of  CP  BenCP  will  be  limited  to 
BenCP  =  f.(pJb     pn).  As  the  CP  would  always  aim 
at  generating  positive  benefit,  the  following  constraint 
should hold 
 
TABLE I: List of variables used in the content distribution  
model 
 
 
D. Example 
pJb > pn. (1) 
 
equations (derivation of these equations are given in the next 
Section): 
xj 
Let us describe the proposed hybrid content distribution 
model with an example. Let us consider a new content c of 
size f Bytes that has been introduced by the CP at a certain 
point of time t0. We also consider a group of x = 4 users 
BenCP = f [(pb 
j=1 
− pn ) αj + (pJb − (yj − 1) pu ) (1 − αj)] 
u = u1, u2, u3, u4 who are interested in c and among them, 
user u4 is the only Premium user (i.e., y = 1). Let us present 
the exchange of messages when the first user (u3) requires 
Benuserj   = f [(−pbαj − p
J
b (1 − αj)) + βj (1 − αj) (yj − 1) (pcuo−ntesn)]t c. 
where 
 
αj 
 
and 
 
= 
1, user j gets content as Premium user 
0, otherwise 
t1: At this time instant, u3 decides to download c. As u3 is 
a Standard user, he/she has to check the availability of c with 
other Standard users (in this case, u1 and u2). So, u3 sends 
request to both u1 and u2 to check if c is available at any of 
them. 
t2: As c is not available with u1 or u2, both of them send 
 
βj = 
1, Standard user j is the first one to get the content 
0, otherwise 
negative response to u3. 
t3: u3 then sends a request to CP to download c directly 
from CP’s server as c is not available with any other Standard 
and f is the size of content c. Throughout this paper we 
consider a particular content c and the parameters associated 
with c are summarized in Table I. The problem should be 
solved for any content offered to the customers and hence,   
the price will depend on the number of premium and standard 
users for each content. 
user in the network. 
t4: c is delivered to u3 via fixed network provided by NP. u3 
pays CP an amount of f.pJb, while NP charges CP an amount 
of f.pn to deliver the content to u3. 
t5: Let us consider that at this time, two users (u2 and u4) 
decide to get c. However, u2 decides to get it as a Standard 
Server u1 
u 
 
 
u3 
u4 
Server u1 
u2 u 
u3 u3 
u4 
Server u1 
u4 
. 
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− 
− 
∈ { } 
· 
· · · 
− 
− 
− 
− 
− 
− 
· 
· 
− − 
− − 
− − 
− − 
user and u4 as a Premium user.  As u4 is a Premium user,     
u4 directly sends a request to CP to download c from CP’s  
server. However, as u2 is a Standard user, first u2 checks the 
availability of c with other Standard users (in this case, u1 
and u3). 
t6: c is delivered to u4 via fixed network provided by NP. u4 
pays CP an amount of f.pb. NP charges CP an amount of f.pn 
to deliver the content to u4. On the other hand, u2 gets c from 
u3 via  Wi-Fi  sharing  and  pays  CP  an  amount  of  f.p
J
b.  This 
sharing cost u3 an amount of s.f for energy consumption. At 
the same time, u3 gets a reward of f.pu from CP for sharing 
the content with u2. 
If, at a later point of time t7 > t6, u1 wants to download 
c, u1 can get it from either u2 or u3. To make our model 
simple, we always consider that the first Standard user getting 
the content, will always share it. In this example, u3 shares    
c among the other Standard users, not u2. How the pricing 
policy changes when multiple users share the same content, 
i.e., when u2 also shares c, is a part of future research 
direction. Also, nowadays, users have contracts with local 
network providers, in order to guarantee their connectivity to 
get internet access. That is why, in our model, we ignore the 
price a user has to pay to the NP just to download one media 
at one point of time. Furthermore, users also have contracts to 
one or more CP in order to get access to the content portfolio 
they offer (either their own content or from other CP as e.g., 
MGM), but in this paper we only focus on the interaction 
between a single CP and the users. A more complex model  
with multiple CPs and multiple users is another part of future 
research direction.” 
The  parameters  associated  with  this  content  distribution 
model  are  listed  in  Table  I.  In  the  most  general  case,  we 
can  assume  that  among  all  the  users  who  download  c,  some 
users  opt  for  the  Premium  option  and  some  others  for  the 
Standard  option,  like  the  case  we  described  in  the  previous 
example.  In  this  example,  only  CP  and  u3 own  c  and  can 
share  it,  so  the  bargaining  will  be  only  between  CP  and  u3. 
In  that  case,  BenCP  =  f.pb + 2.f.pJb     2.f.pn     f.pu  and 
Benuser = Benu3  = f.pu    f.p
J
b    f.s. From the expressions 
of BenCP  and Benu3   we observe that CP gets more benefit 
when  more  users  download  the  content  ,  and  u3 gets  more 
benefit when he/she shares the content with more number of 
Standard  users.  The  main  goal  of  both  the  CP  and  u3  is 
to  maximize  their  benefits,  i.e.,  finding  max BenCP ( )  and 
max Benuser( ) respectively. Based on the values of x and y, 
three cases can arise which are discussed in the next Section. 
IV. PROPOSED PRICING POLICY 
There can be three possible scenarios based on the value of 
y: 
• scenario 1: y = 0, all of the x users select Standard 
option. One user gets the content from the server and the 
others (i.e., x − 1) get the content from the first user. 
• scenario 2: y = x, i.e., all of the x users select the 
Premium option. 
• scenario 3: 0 < y < x, (as shown in Fig. 2 for the 
particular case of x=7 and y=3). This is the most general 
case. 
In  this  Section,  we  consider  each  scenario  separately  and 
maximize BenCPi ( ) and Benuseri ( ), where BenCPi ( ) and 
Benuseri ( ) denote the benefit of CP and user respectively in 
the  i-th  scenario  with  i      1, 2, 3  .  While  doing  so,  we  also 
calculate  the  values  of  pb,  pJb  and  pu  in  each  scenario  and 
check if equilibrium (a settlement of price to which both CP 
and user agree) can be obtained in each scenario. 
 
A. Case 1 : y = 0 
In this case, all of the x users select the Standard option. 
This option promotes content sharing and hence, we assume 
that one user gets the content from the server, and the 
remaining x 1 get the content directly from him/her. 
1) CP: In this case, the CP has to deliver the content to at 
least one user from whom all the remaining x 1 users can 
share. The revenue of the CP is f.pJb.x. The cost to deliver  
the content to one user is f.pn. Furthermore, the CP has to 
give a reward to the user who is sharing the content with  
other interested users and thus helping in the distribution of 
the content. The amount of the reward is f.pu per sharing. So, 
the total amount of reward CP has to give is is f.pu.(x 1) as 
the content is shared (x 1) times. So, in this case the total 
benefit generated by CP is : 
BenCP1  = f.p
J
b.x − f.pn − f.pu.(x − 1) (2) 
2) User: When a user downloads the content, it has to pay  
a price of f.pJb to the CP. The user also has to pay for the 
energy consumed while sharing the content with x 1 users, 
which is given by f.s.(x 1). On the other hand, the user gets 
the reward from the CP, which is f.pu.(x 1) for sharing the 
content (x 1) times. 
So, the total benefit of the user can be expressed by 
Benuser1  = f.pu.(x − 1) − f.p
J
b − f.s.(x − 1) (3) 
It is important to note that selecting the Standard option while 
getting a content, gives to the user a chance to have positive 
benefit. This should motivate the user to choose this option  
over Premium option, which always generates a negative 
benefit. 
3) Nash Bargaining Solution (NBS): Here we propose a 
bargaining between CP and users in a situation where: 
• the value of x ≥ 2, 
• there is a conflict of interest on agreement, and 
• there is a possibility of concluding a mutually beneficial 
agreement. 
Considering f  and pn to be constant in this particular game, 
we can see from Eq. 2 that BenCP1   is maximized when the 
function FCP1     =   (p
J
b.x    pu.(x    1)) is maximized. From 
Eq.  3,  we  also  see  that  Benuser1    is  maximized  when  the 
following function Fuser1  =  (pu.(x   1)   p
J
b) is maximized. 
To  maximize  BenCP1 ,  if  the  value  of  p
J
b  is  increased  and 
the  value  of  pu  is  decreased,  value  of  Benuser1   decreases. 
On  the  other  hand,  to  maximize  Benuser1 ,  if  the  value  of 
pu  is  increased  and  the  value  of  pJb  is  decreased,  the  value 
of  BenCP1   decreases.  This  is  a  classic  bargaining  problem 
and by using Nash Bargaining Solution (NBS), each of them 
can settle to a value which lies exactly in the middle of their 
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2 
− 
− 
−   − − 
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− 
eq1 2 2 the revenue of such a user is: f.pu.(x − y − 1). The user’s 
2 
− pn 
2 
− s(x − 1) 
2 
− pn.(y + 1) 
J n 
. Σ 
interests. So, in this case, to attain equilibrium, both CP and 
user should settle to a value of 
F =  
. FCP 1 + Fuser1 
Σ 
= 
pJb(x − 1) 
2) User: The cost associated to the user selecting the 
Standard option and sharing the content with the remaining 
x − y − 1 users is: f.pJb + s.f.(x − y − 1). On the other hand, 
instead of FCP1 and Fuser1 respectively. Thus, at equilibrium, 
benefits in this case can be expressed by: 
FCP1 = Fuser1 = Feq1 . It is to noted that the value of Benuser = f.pu.(x − y − 1) − f.p
J
b − s.f.(x − y − 1) 
Feq1 depends on pJb only and it is independent of pu. 
So, substituting the new values of FCP1 and Fuser1 to Eq. 3) NBS: In this case, BenCP3 is maximized when FCP3 = 
2 and Eq. 3 respectively, the benefits of CP and user become pb.y + pJb.(x − y) − pu.(x − y − 1)  is  maximized,  whereas 
. pJb(x − 1) Σ 
 
Benuser3 is maximized when F user3 = pu .(x − y − 1) − p
J
b 
. pJb(x − 1) Σ 
 
FCP3 
 
and Fuser3 , using NBS equilibrium can be obtained the 
Now, BenCP1  and Benuser1  are in equilibrium. By increasing 
the  value  of  the  same  parameter  (pJb),  both  BenCP1    and 
of CP and user are: 
. pb.y + pJb.(x − y − 1) Σ 
 
 
4) Settlement of Price: We have already seen from Eq. 1 
that pJb > pn. We also know that pn > 0 and the value of 
 
Benuser3 = f.
. pb .y + p
J
b.(x − y − 1) − s.(x − y − 1)
Σ  
(7) 
pn is determined by the network provider. The upper limit 4) Settlement of Price: The benefits of both CP and users 
on  pJb  can  be  set  by  studying  the  market  and  based  on  the 
customer’s willingness to pay for the content. The benefits for 
are maximized when the term Feq3 =  f.
. 
pb.y+p
J
b .(x−y−1) 
Σ
 
both CP and users are now at equilibrium, as both Ben is maximum. We use Lagrange multiplier [16] to obtain the 
and Benuser1 are maximized when Feq1 is maximized. 
CP1 maximum  value  for  Feq3   with  the  constraint  pb  >  p
J
b.  Let 
us  assume  pb − pJb = δ where  δ ∈ R+ .  We  introduce  a  new 
B. Case 2 : y = x 
In this case, all the x users select the Premium option. 
1) CP: The CP has to pay a total amount of f.pn.x to the 
NP to deliver the content to all x users. In return, the CP earns 
a total amount of f.pb.x as revenue. So, in this case, benefit 
variable called Lagrange multiplier (λ) and study the Lagrange 
function defined by 
L = f.(pb.y + pJb.(x − y − 1)) + λ.(pb − pJb − δ) (8) 
The maximum is obtained by setting the derivatives (Eq. 8) to 
zero. 
of CP is: BenCP2  = f.(pb pn).x. 
2) User: In this scenario, user pays a price of f.pb and  
does not generate any revenue, hence, the benefit of user in 
 
and 
∂L 
∂pb 
= f.y + λ = 0 (9) 
this scenario is: Benuser2 = f.pb. 
3) Nash Bargaining Solution (NBS): BenCP2 is maximized 
when pb is maximized (as f , pn and x are constants). On the 
  
∂L 
∂pJb 
Eq. 9 leads to λ 
= f.(x − y − 1) − λ = 0 (10) 
= −f.y, and putting this value of λ 
2 
this  is  again  a  bargaining  situation  as  described  in Section 
IV-A3, equilibrium can be obtained when pb = 0, which is 
in Eq. 10, we  get f.(x y 1) = f.y , i.e., x = 1, which 
contradicts the basic condition as we already stated that lowest 
possible value of x in this case is 2. This proves that we cannot 
very unrealistic. 
4) Settlement of Price:  As no realistic equilibrium (settle- 
ment of price) is not possible, CP selects the value of pb and 
have  a  maximum  value  for  F 
y ≥ 1, x > y and pb > pJb. 
eq3 with the constraints x ≥ 2, 
the upper limit on this value can be set based on the customer’s 
willingness to pay for the content. From the perspective of CP, 
to have a positive benefit, pb should be set at greater than pn. 
C. Case 3 : x > y > 0 
Let us discuss how BenCP3 varies in a simple example. Let 
us define r as the ratio between Premium and Standard service 
costs, i.e., r = pb   = m . Obviously, r > 1. Let us define as 
p b 
k, the percentage of users getting the Premium service, i.e., 
y = k.x. In this case, BenCP3 can be expressed as 
This is the most general case, where from a group of x 
users, y users select the Premium option and the remaining 
x y select the Standard option. Here, as y > 0, so the 
lowest possible value of y is y = 1 and as x > y, the lowest 
possible value of x is x = 2. 
1) CP: The total costs of CP in this case is: f.pn.y+f.pn + 
f.pu(x − y − 1). 
CP generates a revenue of f.pb.y + f.pJb(x − y). 
f.pn 
BenCP3 = n.(r.k.x − x − k.x − 1) − (k.x + 1) 
Let us evaluate the dependence of BenCP3 with respect r, k 
and x. We  use cost units (c.u.) as the basic unit of the pn   
cost when transmitting f = 1 Byte. In all the simulations we 
assume x = 10 and n = 2 unless stated otherwise. 
Fig. 4a shows the variation of BenCP3 with respect k and 
benefit of CP in this case is: 
BenCP3  = f.pb.y+f.p
J
b.(x−y)−f.pu.(x−y−1)−f.pn.(y+1) 
r. It can be observed that for small k, i.e., small number of 
Premium users, r does not influence the benefits. However, as 
the percentage of Premium users increases, the impact of r 
is maximized when pb is minimum. As other hand, Benuser 
(5) 
BenCP1 = f. (4) is maximized. As there is again a conflict of interest between 
Benuser1 = f. 
same way as described in Section IV-A3. Proceeding the same 
way as described in Section IV-A3, the equilibrium benefits 
Benuser1 can be increased and there is no conflict of interest 
anymore. 
BenCP3 = f (6) 
max max 
3 
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2 
≥ 
2 [6]. We randomly select 100 users from them and study their 
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Fig. 4: BenCP 3 dependence for varying parameters in a simple scenario. 
 
also increases (the higher r, the higher the increase). Fig. 4c 
evaluates BenCP3 with respect k and x for r = 2. The figure 
 
• When m < 2, the value of Eq. 12 is still greater than 0    
if 
shows that x plays a major role since even for low k values, 
the benefits increases significantly with x and they do not vary 
(m − n) > (2 − m) 
or, 2m > (n + 2) 
(13) 
substantively with k. Lastly, Fig. 4b depicts the benefits for 
different r and x values, keeping k = 0.5. It can be observed 
that small x limits the benefits independently of r. However, 
for large numbers of users, the benefits increases and more 
significantly, for high r values. 
As n > 1, 2m > 3 or m > 1.5. Thus, the value of Eq. 12 
is greater than 0 when m > 1.5. 
• When m 1.5, 2m <= 3. As we already saw in the 
previous step, the value of Eq. 12 is greater than 0 when 
2m > (n + 2). Combining these two conditions we get 
D. Comparison among Ben , Ben & Ben (n + 2) ≤ 3 or n ≤ 1, which directly violates Eq. 1. 
CP1 CP2 CP3 Thus, we can see that for m > 1.5, BenCP2 is always greater 
When a user gets the content directly from server, the load 
on the server increases and CP also has to take care of the 
content delivery, which includes a lot of other costs. On the 
other hand, when users share content among them, CP does 
than BenCP1 . 
Similarly, subtracting BenCP3 from BenCP2 , we get, 
BenCP2 − BenCP3 = f.pn.(m − 1).x 
not  always  have  to  take  care  of  the  content  delivery  and  it 
costs CP much lesser. This is why we assume that pb > pJb. 
− f.pn .
. m.y + n.(x − y − 1) 
− p
 .(y + 1)
Σ
 
 
(14) 
From  Eq.  1,  we  know  that  pJb > pn .  Hence,  we  can  state 
that  pb > pJb > pn.  As  the  value  of  pn is  beyond  control  of 
= f.pn 
.(2m − n − 2).x + (n + 2).y + n + 2 Σ 
 
both CP and users, let us use pn as the smallest unit of money 
and express pb and pJb in terms of pn: 
pb = m.pn       pJb = n.pn (11) 
where m and n are considered to be positive real numbers with 
m > n (as  we  already  assumed  pb > pJb at  an  earlier  point) 
and  n > 1 (as  we  already  know  from  Eq.  1  that  pJb > pn). 
Considering these values in the benefit of CP, given in Eq. 4, 
it can be expressed as 
Thus, BenCP2 > BenCP3 holds when 2m > (n + 2), which 
is same as Eq. 13. 
From these calculations in this section, we can conclude that 
for m > 1.5, BenCP2 is the highest among BenCP1 , BenCP2 
and BenCP3 . 
 
V. REAL LIFE STUDY 
To study our proposed solution in a real life scenario, we 
consider a peer-to-peer content distribution network formed by 
BenCP1 = f.pn 
.
. n(x − 1) 
− 1
Σ Wi-Fi signals [7]. We use a real life dataset of the BBC iPlayer, 
which is one of the most popular catch-up TV services in the 
Let us compare this benefit with the benefit that the CP 
would get in Case 2 (BenCP2 ). Subtracting BenCP1 from 
BenCP2 , we get 
UK, used by over 60% of the total population. We analyze   
the content access pattern using BBC iPlayer trace file of July 
2014 which consists of around 215 million sessions from 25 
Ben − Ben = f.p .(m − 1).x − f.p 
. n.(x − 1) 
− 1
Σmillion distinct users and 17 million different IP addresses 
 
=f.pn 
.(m − n).x + (m − 2).x + n + 2 Σ 
 
 
 
(12) 
content access history. Out of the 100 users we select, we 
assume x among them use premium option and the rest of 
them use standard option, where x can vary between 0 and 
Let us find the values of m for which the value of Eq. 12 
is greater than 0: 
• As  m > n, when m 2, the value of Eq. 12 is greater 
than 0. 
100. We randomly select x number of users from the set of 
100 users, do this random selection in a confidence interval   
of 95% and plot the benefit of the CP for various values of x. 
The benefit is expressed as f.pn.109 where f = 1GB. 
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Fig. 5: Ben dependence for varying parameters in a real life scenario. 
 
From Fig. 5 we see that when the value of n increases, 
   Scenario BenCP LR  
the benefit of the CP also increases, because both pb and pJb 
becomes  much  greater  than  pn .  Also,  from  all  plots  in  Fig. 
5  we  see  that  when  the  value  of  r is  low,  i.e.,  the  value  of 
pb and pJb are within close range of each other, the benefit of 
the CP gradually decreases when the percentage of premium 
user  increases  because  as  the  percentage  of  standard  users 
is  decreasing,  content  sharing  among  them  is  also  reducing 
while the cost to put the content at one user remains the same, 
which in return reduces the overall benefit of the CP. But when 
the  percentage  of  standard  users  becomes  0,  there  is  no  cost 
invloved  for  the  CP  to  put  the  content,  and  that  is  why  we 
notice a sharp increase in the benefit between y = 90 and y = 
100. 
From these plots it is  obvious  that  the  higher  the  value 
of n gets, the more benefit CP gets. Also, if CP wants to  
make profit independent of the percentage of premium users, 
the value of r should be  greater  than  or  equal  to  4.  We  
also observe that the benefit of the CP is maximum when    
the percentage of premium users is highest (100%). So, from 
the perspective of CP, the most profitable content distribution 
model is when he and only he has the control over his content 
and he can determine the price accordingly. But the problem 
with this centralized content distribution model has already  
been discussed in Section I. That is why in the next Section 
we try to trade off between these two model and obtain the 
revised pricing policy taking these factors into account. 
 
VI. EXTENSION OF PRICING POLICY 
The CP has two main important objectives to consider: 
• maximize the benefits (BenCP ), and 
• minimize the load on the server (LR). 
Scenario 1 f. 
p
J
b .(x−1)−2pn x   1 
Scenario 2 f.(pb − pn).x 0 
Scenario 3 f. pb .y+p
J
b .(x−y−1)−2pn(y+1) x−y−1 
 
TABLE II: CP’s benefits and load reduction for the three cases 
 
 
 
The benefit of CP and the load reduction on the server for   
the three previous cases presented in Section IV, have been 
summarized in Table II. 
CP has to prioritize one of these two objectives, because as 
we have already seen in Section IV-D, the benefit for CP is 
maximum when m > 1.5, and in that scenario, reduction of 
load on the server is minimum (i.e., LR = 0%). The lesser the 
load on the server, the lesser is the maintenance cost. Let us 
then assume, for simplicity, a proportional model of the extra 
benefits with respect the load reduction: A load reduction of   
a factor of g, implies an increase of CP’s benefit equal to φg, 
where φ > 0 is the proportionality constant. At the end of this 
section we discuss how the value of φ can be calculated. 
Let us also assume that CP wants to balance between these 
two factors, and accordingly the CP gives weights α and β 
to benefits and load respectively, such that α + β = 1. In this 
way, the CP wants to maximize his utilization by maximizing 
the following target function TFCP = α.BenCP + β.φ.LR. 
The value of the weights - α and β, are to be determined by 
only CP. Let us consider three cases based on the value of α 
and β: 
r = 2 
r = 4 
r = 6 
r = 8 
r = 2 
r = 4 
r = 6 
r = 8 
r = 2 
r = 4 
r = 6 
r = 8 
r = 2 
r = 4 
r = 6 
r = 8 
B
e
n
e
fi
t 
(i
n
 f
. 
p
n
. 
1
0
9
)  
B
e
n
e
fi
t 
(i
n
 f
. 
p
n
. 
1
0
9
)  
B
e
n
e
fi
t 
(i
n
 f
. 
p
n
. 
1
0
 )
 
9
 
B
e
n
e
fi
t 
(i
n
 f
. 
p
n
. 
1
0
9
)  
9 
 
αf 
p b 
→
max 
x 
δmin 
δmin 
A. Case 1 : α = 0, β = 1 
In this case, CP only aims at reducing the load on its server. 
Putting this value of pJb in Eq. 16 we get pb = 2 βφ  . Hence, 
the values of pb and pJb are independent of x. Also, 
According to Table II, the load reduction is maximized in 
Scenario 2 and minimized for Scenario 1. 
1 pJb 
= 
r pb 
= 1 − 
pnαf 
βφ 
B. Case 2: α = 1, β = 0 
This  case  is  considered  when  the  CP  wants  to  maximize 
the benefit. This case is the one discussed in detail in Section 
IV,  along  with  the  pb  and  pJb  values  for  the  three  different 
scenarios. 
 
C. Case 3: α > 0, β > 0 and α + β = 1 
In  Section  IV  we  discussed  the  values  of  pb  and  pJb  in 
three different cases. However, when CP launches a new media 
content, CP does not know in advance the values of x and y. 
So,  CP  should  have  such  a  policy  such  that  the  value  of  its 
TFCP  always remains the same and the value if independent 
of  the  values  of  x and  y.  It  happens  only  if  the  value  of  the 
TFCP  is same in all of the three cases. 
If we equalize the TFCP of Case 1 and Case 2, we get: 
α.f.p .x = α.f.pJ . 
(x − 1)
 
Based on the value of  p
J
b , once the values of f , pn, α and β 
are known, the value of φ can also be easily calculated. 
 
VII. CONCLUSION 
We considered a digital media delivery system consisting  
of two main players: user and Content Provider (CP). CP 
launches the content in his digital platform so that users get     
it either directly from the server or from another user who   
has already downloaded it. Based on the number of users 
using each option, we considered three different cases and 
determine the price of the content in each case.  We  used 
Nash Bargaining Solution (NBS) to determine the prices and 
discussed if equilibrium can be obtained in each case. We 
considered CP to have mainly two objectives: maximizing the 
benefit and reducing the load on the server. The load on the 
server can be reduced if users share content among themselves. 
In this paper we provided a pricing policy from the perspective 
b 
 
+ (α.pn 
b 
 
x.f − α.pn 
2 
.f + β.φ. 
(x − 1)
) 
x 
(15) of CP in three different cases based on the priority of CP. 
There are a few directions in which this work can be further 
extended. In the peer-to-peer network model, we considered 
Similarly equalizing the TFCP of Case 2 to Case 3 and 
combining it with Eq. 15, we obtain 
only one user would cache the  content  and  would  share  
with others. As a next step, multiple content caching and 
pb = pJb + 2pn 
2βφ 
+ 
αfx 
(16) 
sharing scenario can be considered. Also, we considered in the 
standard option, a user always gets the content from another 
As  pn > 0, β > 0, α > 0 and f  > 0,  pb > pJb,  which  is  the 
basic motivation of our solution to pursue more users to choose 
the  standard  option.  If  we  consider  that  the  large  number  of 
users get the content, i.e., large value of x, we can approximate 
user. It can be also studied how the pricing varies when the 
user does not always get the content from another user, instead 
he has to get it directly from the server. 
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